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1.

Introduction
Since January 2002, twelve member states of the European Union (EU) have introduced the notes and coins of the Euro. Only Denmark, Sweden and the United Kingdom rejected membership of the European Monetary Union (EMU) and consequently haven't introduced the new currency yet. Citizens of the participating states have been reminded every day since the introduction of the new currency that they live in the EU and that political decisions in Europe are not merely declarations of intent.
Money is more than just a medium of exchange, a store of purchasing power or a factor of evaluation. It brings to mind, and goes hand in hand with, the symbolic identification of a nation in terms of subjectively felt togetherness. However, so far there isn't a European national state in existence and the Euro has to get by without being identified with a unified and real country. Nevertheless, it is expected that the implementation of the Euro promotes the formation of a European identity.
European-wide polls show that the acceptance to the new currency differs between the states (European Commission, 2001 . The lowest proportion of people being in favour for the Euro is observed in those countries which are not participating in the EMU (Denmark, Sweden and the UK). However, acceptance is also low in Germany and Finland. Both countries belong to the group of countries which receive their national identity primarily through their economic and political system. 1 In contrast, there is a much higher proportion of people accepting the Euro in such states in which the national identity is strongly defined by cultural dimensions. Italy and Greece belong to these countries (Müller-Peters, 1998, p. 709; Pepermans and Verleye, 1998, p. 687ff.) .
German history shows why the economic system is so important for national identity. One consequence of the Second World War is that flags and hymns are problematic symbols of identification for a lot of Germans. Instead the German Mark developed into a national symbol which expressed the economic recovery and prosperity (Helleiner, 1998) . Even for residents of the German Democratic Republic the German Mark was a good to aspire to as it indicated freedom and wealth.
Nevertheless, the Germans seemed to quickly distance themselves from the German Mark after the Euro notes and coins were issued in January 2002. Instead of the expected 'Europhobia' it came apparently to a 'Euro-phoria' in the first weeks following the introduction of the legal tender. However, once a lively discussion about price increases in the context of the currency reform had emerged, the worries concerning the Euro returned. By spring 2000, the Germans were once again the Europeans with the lowest acceptance of the Euro (European Commission, 2001 . Whether the price increases were real or only part of a subjective feeling of inflation (Jonas et al., 2002) is not important. If individual information and experience about a social object is weak, social knowledge which is communicated by mass media can determine attitudes (Meier and Kirchler, 1998, p. 757) . If people believe that prices are higher due to the introduction of the Euro, they therefore develop reasons to become concerned about the Euro.
There are not only cross-national differences in the acceptance which can be traced back partly to a national identity, but there are also great variations within a country. Therefore we look at the individual factors influencing the attitudes towards the Euro. We concentrate on one country only, namely Germany, because there has been only low acceptance of the Euro there and a national-wide, representative Panel-Study with data on this topic exists.
Previous research and theoretical background
Attitudes are an important social-psychological construct with a wide theoretical tradition (Allport, 1954; Chaiken and Stangor, 1987) . They are positive or negative evaluations of objects. Attitudes can be affective or cognitive and they can determine the behaviour of individuals too. Attitudes are mainly the result of cognitive information processing. So they can reflect short-term positive or negative emotions or long-term beliefs which are determined by knowledge or general beliefs as part of socialisation processes and experiences in the past.
Knowledge and general beliefs influence the concerns towards the Euro
The existing literature on attitudes towards the Euro reveal two dominant factors influencing this attitude, namely the extent of knowledge and general beliefs (see for example Müller-Peters, 1998; Müller-Peters et al., 1998a; Müller-Peters et al., 1998b; Müller-Peters et al., 1998c; Pepermans and Verleye, 1998; Isengard and Schneider, 2002; Meier-Pesti and Kirchler, 2003) .
The information level is crucial in building up an attitude as consequences can be evaluated better. The literature states that highly informed people have a more positive attitude towards the Euro. This is the case even if they are not personally convinced by the Euro, and they are able to cope with the situation better, something which cannot be altered. This case is called secondary control (Rothbaum et al., 1982 The other main factor influencing personal attitudes are general beliefs, as new things have to be integrated into the existing system of beliefs as they influence openness to new situations.
Different socialisation processes and experiences in the past may lead to different general beliefs and cultures, and therefore they produce differences in thinking, feeling and acting (Schwartz, 1997) .
Life satisfaction influences the ability to deal with innovations. Happier individuals find it is easier to adapt to new situations. In addition, people with more optimistic life attitudes are more open concerning social, political or economic change (see Müller-Peters et al., 1998c, p. 670 ).
2.2
Theories on attitude change: learning process, self perception, reactance and dissonance
The question of what causes a change in attitudes towards the Euro can be explained by different social-psychological theories (see for example Osgood et al., 1957; Chaiken and Stangor, 1987) These changes are conceptualised as a result of a learning process, of a perception process or of adapting cognitions.
According to the theory of attitude changes as a result of learning process, the process is a function of the admission of message contents and their reinforcement (Hovland et al., 1953; Staats, 1968) . This approach permits both increasing acceptance and increasing refusal after the implementation. In the case of the implementation of the Euro, the media reports first transmitted positive and then negative message contents. This should be relevant for constituting an opinion. Bem (1972) attributes changes of attitudes to a process of self perception, whereby people judge their behaviour from their attitudes under certain circumstances. This is particularly the case if internal references are weak and no pronounced knowledge is present. If this theory is to apply to the concerns towards the Euro, then a necessary precondition is that people have no firm opinion on the Euro. The observed behaviour of quickly getting rid of the old German Mark would lead from the daily behaviour ('I pay with Euro instead of German Mark') to a positive attitude ('I like the Euro because I have no problems with paying with it').
Furthermore there are approaches which attribute attitude changes to cognitive processes.
Under cognitions we understand all of a person's thoughts, i.e. opinions, value attitudes, knowledge or beliefs. We discuss two theories out of this approach which lead to different predictions about the attitudes towards the former German currency and the Euro: on the one hand the theory of cognitive dissonance and on the other hand the theory of reactance.
The theory of cognitive dissonance implies that people aspire to a balanced cognitive system (Festinger, 1957) . The relations of cognitions among themselves can be either relevant (content is coherent) or irrelevant (content is incoherent). Relevant relations can be consonant or dissonant. Cognitive dissonance is generated for example if one shows behaviour which is inconsistent with one's own opinion. An aversive feeling will be generated, as well as the motivation to avoid or eliminate this. If the shown behaviour is not reversible, then the preferred kind of dissonance reduction is to adapt the opinion to the behaviour. The implementation of the Euro develops dissonance if people reject the new currency. As one can only escape this situation by emigration, the cost-effective way of reducing cognitive dissonance is to change the attitude.
On the contrary, according to the theory of reactance (Brehm, 1966) , individuals aspire to behave freely. If their freedom of choice is threatened or does not exist any more psychological reactance emerges. In this case people attempt to recover the endangered or lost liberty by upgrading the threatened or eliminated alternative and devaluating the forced alternative (Brehm, 1976 ). This cognitive restructuring process is motivated by resistance against liberty restriction and not adapting to conformity. In the case of the Euro individuals could not decide about its introduction, and found their personal decision freedom threatened.
Consequently, they should refuse the Euro and enhance the previously valid German Mark.
According to the theories of self-perception and cognitive dissonance, the concerns about the Euro should decrease after its introduction. The first assumption is that individuals evaluate the Euro positively because they use it every day, while the second states that individuals cannot change the situation and that cognitive dissonance can only be diminished by adapting to institutional conditions. Following the theory of reactance we expect that the concerns towards the Euro will increase after the introduction of the new bank notes and coins because people feel that their freedom has been reduced and react defiantly. Only theories conceptualising attitude changes as a result of learning processes offer the possibility of explaining both a reduction and an increase of concerns towards the Euro. Thereby message contents such media reports, personal experience through travelling abroad and the acceptance in the social environment are important.
Data
The 3 Recent questionnaires are available at http://www.diw.de/english/sop/service/fragen/index.html. 4 The variable highest school attainment is differentiated into three dummy variables for individuals with none or low, intermediate and high qualification. The last one contains individuals with a maturity certificate. Those who are still in school belong to a fourth dummy variable. 5 People who report that they use the internet either for private or professional reasons are coded as 1, otherwise 0. 6 Four categories are available for political interest: not at all, not so much, much and very much. We captured each category by a dummy variable. 7 The question on expected life satisfaction in 5 years time is measured by an eleven-point scale, with 0 for totally unhappy and 10 for totally happy. In our analysis we construct four dummy variables, for expecting to be unhappy (categories 0 to 4), ambivalent (category 5), happy (categories 6 to 9) and totally happy (category 10). 8 Müller-Peters (2001, p. 38f.) figured out that countries in which people are satisfied higher than average rather reject the Euro compared to countries in which satisfaction is below the average in EU comparison. There the Euro is rather endorsed. On the other hand a reversed picture is reflected on the individual level per country. The more satisfied individuals are, the larger the acceptance of the new currency and vice versa. 9 We construct for each party preference a dummy variable. It should be noticed that nearly half of the respondents report that they don't have any affiliation to a party.
National and regional origin is not a general belief in the sense of definition. 10 Nevertheless, it can be assumed that we can observe origin-specific attitudes towards the Euro which depend on socialisation and cultural influences. The feeling of losing national autonomy, as well as that of dependence on other European states regarding money issues could influence the attitudes towards the new currency (Jonas et al., 2002, p. 148 ).
The German Mark shouldn't be a national symbol for foreigners and in addition, 11 those from the EU should see direct advantages of the single currency.
Results
The development of concerns towards the Euro
First we look at the extent of concerns towards the Euro and on their development over a period of time (cf. Fig. 1 ). The proportion of individuals with concerns was 60% in 1999, in the following two years they were somewhat higher (68% and 67% 
What are the concerns towards the Euro?
There is a high correlation between the extent of the more general concerns towards the Euro and the expected advantages or disadvantages (cf. Fig. 2 
Determinants of concerns towards the Euro
To test what influences the concerns we assumed an ordered logit model 12 as the dependent variable has three categories -none, somewhat and strong concerns towards the Euro. Positive regression coefficients indicate stronger concerns, negative ones lower or no concerns. The results for being concerned in 2001 are reported in model 1 (cf. Table 2 ).
Insert Table 2 about here We can see that those with a higher educational qualification 13 are less concerned about the implementation of the Euro compared to individuals with middle or low qualification.
However, there is a slight probability that young people still attending school may be concerned. above for Spain and Portugal. Here, the suspicion that inexistent political interest leads to an unconcerned attitude towards the Euro is obvious.
The third factor describing level of knowledge is internet usage. 14 Individuals using modern media are less concerned about the new currency compared to people not using internet. In Table 3 we provide an example of how the level of knowledge influences the probability of being concerned. Therefore we calculate the probability of being somewhat or very concerned for a person with special characteristics (46 year-old man from West Germany etc.) using model 1. If this person has a low level of education and doesn't use the internet, he has a probability of 77% for having concerns. However, if this person is highly educated, the probability decreases to 66%. If this 'hypothetical' person uses the internet, the probability decreases again to 59%.
Insert Table 3 about here We return again to model 1 and look at the variables indicating general beliefs. Those who are expecting to be happy or even totally happy in five years time are significantly less concerned about the future currency than those who are ambivalent on this topic. On the other hand, people who have a pessimistic attitude towards the future have stronger concerns.
Next we look at the political affiliation; our reference group is the Social Democrats (SPD).
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Affiliates of the other mass party, the Christian-Democrats (CDU) have a few more concerns than the Social Democrats. Individuals with a party preference for the Socialist party (PDS, former East German Communists) don't differ from the Social Democrats. People with a long-lasting party preference for the Liberal Democratic Party (FDP) and for the Green Party (Grüne) are less worried compared than the Social Democrats. In contrast, supporters of the extreme right-wing parties (e.g. DVU) have a significantly higher probability of being 14 Using the internet includes all individuals who state that they use internet either privately or professionally. For national and regional origin we can observe large differences in the degree of concerns. 16 We can observe that Germans, and especially East Germans, are more concerned about the Euro than foreigners. Furthermore, foreigners coming from an EU country are less concerned than other foreigners. Both groups have a lower attachment to the German Mark and EU foreigners have direct advantages by travelling and transferring money to their home country (except those from Denmark, Sweden and the United Kingdom). But there are also strong differences between German citizens. East Germans are much more concerned about the Euro than West Germans. They got the 'desired' German Mark in 1990, but their vision of a rapid economic boom has not been achieved. On the contrary, there are high unemployment rates within East Germany, as well as movement of labour in the direction of West Germany.
Again we give some examples in Table 4 . Here we look at the influence of origin and ethnicity on having concerns -independently of the extent -and on having strong concerns towards the Euro (for a person with specific characteristics). If the person originates from East Germany, he has a probability of 85% to be somewhat or strongly worried. A comparable West German person is 8%-points less likely to have concerns, while an EU foreigner is nearly 20% less likely to have concerns. If we calculate the probabilities of having only strong concerns, we reveal the same pattern although the distances are greater. A West German is 14%-points less likely to have strong concerns than an East German one and a EU foreigner 25%-points. The distance between West Germans and EU foreigners remain in both cases the same. 15 Nearly every second person has no party preference.
Insert Table 4 about here Finally, we consider income position, gender and age. We found that people who are in the highest income quartile have a minor risk of being concerned than individuals with middle incomes. 17 However, there is no significant effect for the lowest income group observable.
Men have a lower probability of being concerned about the new currency than women. This pattern is well known through research on concerns, anxiety and anomy. The age effect is somewhat awkward. In bivariate analyses we found a positive correlation between age and concerns, but controlling for other variables such as 'still in school' changes the effect.
Changing attitudes towards the Euro
In order to look at changing concerns before and after the introduction of the Euro cash we estimate some logit models. 18 We model the loss of, as well as the development of concerns.
To illustrate the proceedings, we produced In the estimated models 2 and 3 in table 2, a positive logistic regression coefficient indicates that it is more likely to be a 'mover', a negative one indicates that it is more likely to be a 16 We differentiate between Germans, separated for individuals living in East and West Germany, and foreigners. They are differentiated between foreigners from an EU country (also including the three states which are not participating) and from all other states. 17 We use needs-adjusted equivalence incomes and grouped them into four quartiles, but we only included the lowest and highest quartile in the regression model. In models 2 and 4 we use the same variables as in model 1, and additionally the month of questioning. In models 3 and 5 we also include the difficulties in handling the new money and in converting prices from German Mark into Euros. First we discuss model 2, which looks at getting rid of one's concerns towards the Euro. We observe that the higher the formal school attainment, the greater the probability of changing from being concerned in 2001 to not concerned in 2002. There is also a strong effect for people still in school. For this group the chances of losing the worries are significantly higher and the impact of political interest is not very pronounced. The probability of losing worries is only significantly higher for those who have a high level of interest in politics. Using the internet has a strong effect. Individuals who use this medium have are more likely to change, in contrast to people who don't use the internet. The pattern of expected life satisfaction in 5 years time is similar to the one observed in model 1. Individuals who expect to be (totally) happy in the future have a higher probability of losing their concerns compared to the ambivalent group. In contrast, people who expect to be unhappy in five years have a higher probability of remaining concerned.
Next we look at the influence of long-lasting party preference. People with a party preference for the extreme right-wing parties have a significantly higher probability of not giving up their 18 For details see Long, 1997, p. 50ff.
concerns compared to the supporters of the Social Democrats. In contrast, supporters of the Green Party have a higher probability of losing their concerns after implementation. The same applies for people without any party preference. There is no statistically significant effect for the supporters of the Liberal Democratic Party. However, we have to keep in mind that there is only a small number of cases which include people such as these.
People from East Germany and foreigners from outside the EU have a higher probability of remaining concerned than West Germans and EU foreigners. The effect on non-EU foreigners is astonishing at first glance; this is something that we will discuss later.
The month of questioning in 2002 is important for explaining changes of attitudes after the implementation, 19 as the German media reported positively about the Euro at first, but suddenly turned to a critical coverage, especially on price rises. The probability of changing from being concerned to not concerned is at its highest in January. In the following month the probability of losing worries declines steadily. We illustrate this effect by calculating some probabilities for a more or less 'hypothetical' person (middle age, low-educated man etc.). We observe that the probability of abandoning concerns falls continuously from 34% in January to 22% in May (cf. Table 5 ). On the other hand, if we calculate the probability of becoming concerned by using the results of model 4 (not discussed yet), we have a steady rise from 24%
in January to 47% in May.
Insert Table 5 about here In model 3 we expand the set of variables, and in addition take into account the difficulties in handling the new money and converting prices. There are strong effects between continuing to be concerned about the Euro and having difficulties with the new money. Problems in handling the Euro impede the giving up of worries. There are also strong negative effects for the variables, indicating the conversion of prices from German Mark into Euros. However, the coefficients are somewhat smaller. Again, we exemplify the influence of these two indicators for a more or less fictitious person (cf. Table 6 ). If a person doesn't have any difficulties in handling the new money (but some in converting prices) he has a probability of 31% of giving up the concerns. If he has some difficulties the probability goes down to 18% and the probability of quitting his worries is very low, if he has great difficulties in handling the new money. The pattern and the figures for converting prices are comparable.
Insert Table 6 about here
If we compare the coefficients of the other variables included in model 2 and in model 3, they are fairly similar, albeit with some exceptions. There is no significant influence of politic interest in model 3. This could be a hint at the fact that people with political interest are better informed on the Euro and can handle it much better. The other remarkable changes are those for origin. East Germans are still the ones who have the lowest probability of losing their concerns. The lowest concerns observable are for EU foreigners. Now they differ significantly from West Germans (in model 2 they doesn't). Other foreigners in models 2 and 3 are comparable with East and West Germans respectively. Controlling for handling causes these displacements. Simple cross tabulations reveal that both groups of foreigners have greater problems in handling the new currency. Not controlling for it produces negative biased effects for foreigners.
In models 4 and 5 we look at matters the other way round: being not concerned in 2001 to being concerned in 2002. The effects are in the same sense as those of models 2 and 3, as a positive coefficient here leads to less people being concerned, and in models 4 and 5 a negative coefficient prevents people from becoming concerned. It should be accentuated that in models 4 and 5, the income effects are not only significant for the high income group (with a higher probability to stay in the group without worries), but also for the lowest income group. They have a higher probability to change their attitude from 2001 (not concerned) to 2002 (being concerned) compared to middle income groups. This may be due to the fact that real price increases and the discussion on this topic in the media hit the people with low income.
It is worth pointing out that the difficulties in handling the new money have a particularly strong influence on the concerns. In the fourth column of Table 6 , we calculate the probabilities of becoming concerned with respect to difficulties in handling the new money. If 'our' person has no difficulties in this area, he has a probability of 31% of becoming concerned. If the same person has some difficulties, the probability rises to 49% and if they experience large problems the figure rises to 74%. Compared to this, the influence of converting prices (last column) is much lower.
Bringing together theories on attitude change and empirical results
As worries about the Euro decline from 2001 to 2002 (cf. Fig. 1 ) the theory of reactancewhich implies an increase after the implementation of the Euro -is not plausible for explaining the attitude change in Germany. By looking at the development of the concerns within the year 2002 differentially, we see that they fell directly after the Euro notes and coins were distributed. However, this drop was only temporary (cf. model 3 and 5 in Table 2 ).
The theory of cognitive dissonance implies declining worries after implementation, because people want to abolish stress which emerges if they are still against the new currency. As the concerns don't fall steadily -and in fact we observe the opposite-this theory doesn't seem 
Conclusion and outlook
The implementation of a single European currency -the Euro -is so far one of the biggest political projects enables the promotion of European unity. However, in some states acceptance is not high even after the implementation, e.g. as is the case in Germany.
However, it is necessary for the 'European idea' that the new currency is accepted. Otherwise the development of critical European resentments could be promoted. We also found that difficulties in handling the new currency have a particularly strong influence on the concerns towards the Euro. Taking all of these factors in to account together, it seems that providing the population with more information could reduce the concerns.
Additionally, the discussion about price rises in the German press suggests that a double pricing in the old currency and in Euros could be helpful. This should lead to a decrease in handling difficulties and consequently to lower concerns. Furthermore, it should prevent the real or only 'subjectively felt' price rises. Price rises indeed seem to have an influence on the concerns. We argued that the monthly pattern of remaining and becoming concerned in 2002 could be traced back to the media reports on price rises.
Finally, we mentioned that the empirical analyses show that those who profit most from the new currency in Germany, i.e. EU foreigners, have lower concerns towards the Euro.
However, the abolishment of the exchange rate and the opportunity for direct price comparisons are not only advantageous for EU foreigners, but also for Germans travelling into a country of the EMU. This advantage will be experienced by all individuals who are a citizen of an EMU country and travel or work in another one. Probabilities calculated out of model 3 and 5 for a 46 years old, low educated male with middle income, ambivalent future expectations, who does not use the internet, who has little interest in politics and has no party preference who gave his interview on February. 2 Additionally, the man has some difficulties in converting prices. 3 Additionally, the man has some difficulties in handling the new money.
